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“Hardly Be Said to Offer An
Education at All”: Endrew and its
Impact on Special Education
Mediation
GRANT SIMON *

I. INTRODUCTION
As the standards for special education students in America rise, the need to
handle the resulting disputes arises as well. Special education disputes are a common yet emotional process for all parties involved. Such disputes can result in a
split between the family and the school district- a split that can potentially leave
negative consequences on the student. In 1975, Congress, realizing the personal
nature and prevalence of special education issues, passed what would become the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1 The IDEA offers states federal funds to assist in educating children with disabilities.2 This Act also authorizes
the child’s parents the right to make use of mediation for resolving these disputes.3
This alternative dispute resolution process for special education claims solves thousands of claims each year without having to pursue further litigation.4 However, in
light of the recent Supreme Court decision Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist.
RE-1, the Court’s new and more demanding standard of what a child’s educational
goals must be could potentially change the role of mediation in special education
disputes.
This Case Note discusses the recent Supreme Court decision in Endrew.5 The
Case Note then will address the potential impact the Court’s ruling could have on
the future role of mediation in special education. Finally, this Case Note will also
address the potential procedural changes school districts may have to make when
considering the new Endrew standard.

*

B.A. Truman State University 2015, J.D. University of Missouri 2019. I am incredibly grateful to Professor James Levin for his feedback and guidance with this Comment. I would also like to thank the
editorial staff of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for the time spent editing this Comment. Finally, I
would like to thank my mother, Kathy McCarthy, for being my most influential guidance and sparking
my interest in special education topics.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2010).
2. See 20 U. S. C. §1400 (2010); see also Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548
U. S. 291, 295 (2006).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2004).
4. Carolyn Thompson, Following Supreme Court ruling, more special education fights seen coming,
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin (May 17, 2010), http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Archives/2017/05/10/Special-ed-funding-5-10-17.
5. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

1

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2018, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 17

134

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2018

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Petitioner Endrew F. (“Endrew”) was a child with autism enrolled in respondent Douglas County Colorado School District (“School District”) from preschool
through fourth grade.6 During this time, Endrew was enrolled in special education
courses with an Individual Educational Plan (“IEP”)7 created by School District
employees.8 By the time Endrew reached the fourth grade, his parents believed that
his academic progress had stalled.9 For evidence of this fear, Endrew’s parents
noted that Endrew still exhibited behaviors that negatively impacted his ability to
learn in the classroom.10 For example, Endrew would scream in class, climb over
furniture and other students, and occasionally run away from school.11 He was also
afflicted by severe fears of common everyday occurrences such as flies, spills, and
public restrooms.12 However, despite Endrew’s parents concern about his progress
stalling, Endrew’s IEP remained largely unchanged by carrying over the same basic
goals and objectives from one year to the next.13 School District staff indicated that
these goals were being carried over because Endrew was failing to make meaningful
progress toward these goals.14
When the School District proposed a fifth grade IEP that still failed to adjust
Endrew’s goals, Endrew’s parents removed him from public school and enrolled
him in a specialized private school for children with autism.15 At this school, Endrew made significant educational progress rapidly.16 Concurrently, while Endrew
was enrolled at his new private school, School District representatives approached
Endrew’s parents with a new fifth grade IEP.17 Endrew’s parents considered this
plan as inadequate as the original IEP, and, pursuant to statute, sought reimbursement for his private school tuition by filing an IDEA complaint with the Colorado
Department of Education.18
To succeed on their complaint, Endrew’s parents had to show that the School
District did not provide their son a Free and Appropriate Public Education

6. Id. at 991.
7. The IEP is “the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system for disabled children” that
identifies the unique needs a particular child needs to receive an adequate education. See Honig v. Doe,
484 U. S. 305, 311, (1988); see also Endrew, 137 S. Ct. 988 (noting that the IEP “is the means by which
special education and related services are tailored to the unique needs of a particular child”).
8. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 991.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 996.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 996.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 997.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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(“FAPE”)19 as required by IDEA prior to his enrollment at the private school.20
Endrew’s parents alleged that the final IEP proposed by the School District did not
meet the required legal standard of being “reasonably calculated” to enable Endrew
to receive his required educational benefits.21 Therefore, Endrew’s parents argued
that Endrew had been denied a FAPE.22 The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
denied relief, and Endrew’s parents appealed to the federal district court.23
The district court, giving due weight to the ALJ’s decision, agreed with the
ALJ that Endrew had not been denied a FAPE.24 However, while affirming the
decision, the district court acknowledged that Endrew’s performance under past
IEPs “did not reveal immense educational growth” but that, regardless, the School
District still met its legal burden of providing FAPE for Endrew because the IEP
objectives at least showed “minimal progress.”25 Because Endrew’s previous IEPs
had enabled him to make at least minimal progress, the court reasoned that Endrew’s latest IEP was reasonably calculated to do the same thing.26 In the federal
district court’s view, that was all what the United States Supreme Court precedent
and FAPE required.27
Following the District Court’s decision to affirm the ALJ’s ruling, Endrew’s
parents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.28 On review, the
court affirmed the lower court, reciting language from Supreme Court precedent
stating that all the School District only had to offer Endrew was “some educational
benefit.”29 The appellate court noted that it had long interpreted this language to
mean that a child’s IEP is adequate and provides FAPE if the IEP is calculated to
confer an “educational benefit [that is] merely . . . more than de minimis.”30 Applying this low standard, the Tenth Circuit held that Endrew’s IEP had been “reasonably calculated to enable [him] to make some progress” and therefore he had not
been denied FAPE.31 The Tenth Circuit also noted that it would not change this “de
minimis” standard absent a superseding decision by the Supreme Court.” 32
Following the Tenth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and overturned the lower courts. The Court held that a “de minimis” educational
benefit is not enough to provide a child with FAPE; rather, school districts must

19. FAPE is a requirement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in order for
the state government to receive federal funds to assist in educating children with disabilities. See 20
U.S.C. 1401 (2015); see also 20 U.S.C. 1412 (2015). It is a guarantee of “a substantively adequate
program of education to all eligible children, and that this requirement is satisfied if the child’s IEP sets
out an educational program that is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester City v. Rowley, 458 U. S.
176, 207 (1982).
20. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 997.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 997
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1340 (10th Cir. 2015).
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offer children an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable each child to make
progress appropriate for that child’s circumstances.”33

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and History of Student
with Disabilities
Requiring public education for children with serious disabilities is a recent historical development.34 For much of American history, students with physical and
mental disabilities were often excluded from public education solely because of
their disabilities.35
For example, in the late 19th century case Watson v. City of Cambridge, a student was excluded from a public school in Cambridge, Massachusetts, by school
officials “because he was too weak-minded to derive profit from instruction.”36
This exclusion was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (“SJC”).37 In affirming this student’s exclusion, the SJC noted that “by
reason of imbecility, [the student] should not be permitted to continue in the
school.”38
In the 1950’s, children with disabilities were still excluded from public schools.
For example, in Department of Welfare v. Haas39, Haas’ son was “described as
mentally deficient, or feeble minded” and, because of his disability, had to be committed to a hospital for the “mentally deficient” outside of the public school system.40 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the state, and that
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois.41 In doing so, the court
explicitly approved the exclusion of children with cognitive disabilities from public
education, noting that right to a public school education implies that one must have
capacity to receive such an education.42
Prior to congressional action, more than one million American children had no
access to the public school system.43 Recognizing the problem of excluding children with disabilities from receiving an education, Congress passed the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975.44 In 1990, the act was re-codified as the
Individuals with Disabilities Act.45 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the “focus on the particular child is at the core of the IDEA.”46 Today, the IDEA offers
33. Id. at 1341.
34. Gary L. Monserud, Article: The Quest for a Meaningful Mandate for the Education of Children
with Disabilities, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 675, 683 (2004).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 684.
38. Watson v. Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 865 (Mass. 1893).
39. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1958).
40. Id. at 268.
41. Id. at 274.
42. Id. at 270.
43. Jane West, Back to School on Civil Rights: Advancing the Federal Commitment to Leave No Child
Behind, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY 6 (Jan. 25, 2000).
44. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 (1982).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2010).
46. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
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states federal funds to assist in educating children with disabilities.47 In exchange,
a state must comply with a large number of statutory conditions.48 One of these
conditions is that the state must provide a free and appropriate public education to
all eligible children.49 Additionally, to satisfy the FAPE requirement, the state must
have an Individualized Education Plan for all eligible children.50

B. Free and Appropriate Education
To ensure the FAPE requirement is met, the IDEA imposes a variety of procedural and substantive obligations on the state.51 While the procedural obligations
that Congress intended are clearly and explicitly defined within IDEA, the substantive rights and requirements are not.52 For the last forty years, the issue of what
exactly a school must provide to meet the mandate of FAPE is an issue that has
been litigated.53
The procedural steps required by the IDEA focus on protecting the rights for
children with disabilities and the children’s parents.54 These obligations include
detailed procedures that school districts must follow when identifying, evaluating,
and making educational decisions for a student suspected of being, or having been
found to be, eligible for special education services.55 A school cannot label a student for special education services as it pleases.56
Key to protecting a student from improper labeling is IDEA’s exclusionary
clause.57 The IDEA specifies, in part, that a learning problem which primarily results in an environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage cannot be the sole
basis for placing a student in special education.58 The purpose of this exclusionary
clause is to help specifically prevent the improper labeling of children, especially
“those from distinct cultures who have acquired learning styles, language, or behaviors that are not compatible with academic requirements of schools in the dominant culture.”59 However, this does not mean that individuals who met this criteria
cannot also have other disabilities or be from different cultural backgrounds; it
simply cannot be the primary cause behind a learning discretion.60 The exclusionary clause today serves as one of the main procedural safeguards for the child.61

47. See 20 U. S. C. §1400 (2010); see also Arlington Central Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548
U. S. 291, 295 (2006).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2010).
49. 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(1) (2015).
50. 20 U.S.C. §1401(9)(D) (2015).
51. James Schwellenbach, Mixed Messages: An Analysis of the Conflicting Standards Used by the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals when Awarding Compensatory Education for a Violation of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 53 ME. L. REV. 245, 251 (2001).
52. Id.
53. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
54. Schwellenbach, supra note 51, at 252.
55. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C.§1412 (2015); 20 U.S.C. §1414 (2015).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C) (2015).
57. National Association of Special Education Teachers, Introduction to Learning Disabilities,
NASET.org, http://www.naset.org/2522.0.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

5

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2018, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 17

138

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2018

These procedural safeguards extend to the child’s parents as well.62 Parental
protections include, but are not limited to, the parents’ right to participate in the
educational programming and decision making for their child, the requirement of
parental consent before any evaluation or placement, and the right to an impartial
hearing in front of a third party if the parent is not satisfied with the school’s decisions for their child.63 Also, as seen in Endrew, the IDEA also gives parents the
right to file suit in state or federal court once administrative remedies have been
exhausted.64
However, despite how clearly defined IDEA’s FAPE procedural safeguards
are, the only mention of substantive FAPE requirements from the IDEA are that:
The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that--(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
school education ...; and (D) are provided in conformity with [an] individualized
educational program …65
While dictating the requirement of certain key special education features (such
as the requirement of an individualized education plan in order to provide a FAPE),
the vagueness of the substantive standard supplied by the language of the IDEA has
left the meaning and details of FAPE subject to administrative and judicial interpretation.66
Prior to Endrew, the Supreme Court first considered the substantive requirement of FAPE in the case in Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist.,
Westchester Cty. v. Rowley.67 In Rowley, the Court held the Act guarantees an adequate educational program to all special education children, and that this requirement is satisfied if the child’s IEP sets out an educational program that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”68 The Court
noted, for example, that, for children fully integrated in the regular classroom, this
would typically require an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve
passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”69 Because the IEP challenged in
Rowley met this standard, the Court declined to establish a single concrete test for
determining what the adequacy of the educational benefits must be.70 This lack of
concrete test paved the way for the Tenth Circuit to decide educational benefits
must merely be more than de minimis.71

62. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).
63. Schwellenbach, supra note 51, at 252.
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2004).
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2015).
66. See Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A Study in the
Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 366 (1990).
67. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
68. Id. at 206.
69. Id. at 204.
70. Id. at 202.
71. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 997 (2017).
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C. The Individual Education Plan
As one of the few substantive requirements laid out by the IDEA, a state must
provide a child an individualized education plan (IEP).72 The IEP is “the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system for disabled children.” 73 A comprehensive plan prepared by a child’s “IEP Team” (which includes teachers, school
officials, and the child’s parents), an IEP must be drafted in compliance with a detailed set of procedures.74 These procedures emphasize “collaboration among parents and educators and require careful consideration of the child’s individual circumstances.” 75 The IEP is how special education and related services are made to
serve the unique needs of a particular child.76
The IDEA mandates “that every IEP include “a statement of the child’s present
levels of academic achievement and functional performance,” describe “how the
child’s disability affects the child’s involvement and progress in the general education curriculum,” and set out “measurable annual goals, including academic and
functional goals”. 77 Addition, the IDEA requires that the IEP contains a “description of how the child’s progress toward meeting” those goals will be gauged.78 The
IEP must also describe the “special education and related services . . . that will be
provided” so that the child may “advance appropriately toward attaining the annual
goals” and, when possible, “be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum.”79
Above all, the IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress in areas where
the child is behind their peers.80 The instruction offered must be “specially designed” to meet a child’s “unique needs” through an individualized education program.81 An IEP is not a document to be created haphazardly; it requires careful
consideration of the child’s present levels of achievement, disability, and potential
for growth.82

D. The Role of Mediation Within the IDEA
Mediation is defined as a “form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in
which the parties to a lawsuit meet with a neutral third-party in an effort to settle
the case.”83 Mediation differs from other forms of ADR such as arbitration because
the third-party mediator plays a facilitative role that does not have the power to
force a particular outcome.84 Because IDEA does not specify a mediation process,
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (2015).
73. Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 311 (1988).
74. 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(B) (2015).
75. See Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 994; see also 20 U.S.C. §1414 (2015).
76. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,191 (1982).
77. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 994; see also 20 U.S.C. §§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(III) (2015).
78. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 994.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(IV) (2015).
81. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 994.
82. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(IV), (d)(3)(A)(i)-(iv) (2015).
83. Mediation Law, HG.org, https://www.hg.org/mediation-definition.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2017).
84. See Mediation, legal-dictionary.com, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/mediation
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
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a mediator has discretion about the exact steps of a mediation. 85 However, an oftenrecognized model of mediation includes main six steps: introductory remarks, statement of the problem by the parties, information gathering time, identification of the
problems, bargaining and generating options, and reaching an agreement.86
During the introductory remarks, the mediator will give an opening statement
that outlines the role of the participants and demonstrates the mediator’s neutrality.87 The mediator will then define the protocol and set the time frame for the
process.88 Finally, the mediator will review the mediation guidelines and briefly
recap the issues of the party.89
After the opening statement, a mediator will often give each side the opportunity to tell their story uninterrupted.90 The party’s statement is not necessarily a
recital of the facts, but it is meant to give the parties an opportunity to frame the
issue as the parties’ view it.91 The rationale behind the statement of the problem “is
not a search for the truth; it is just a way to help solve the problem” by helping each
side better understand the perspective of the other.92
The next step of a typical mediation process is informal information gathering.93 During this step, the mediator will ask the parties open-ended questions to
get as much information as possible.94 Dependent on the model of mediation used,
the mediator may repeat the key points back to the parties while summarizing the
dispute when possible.95 This helps the mediator build chemistry between the parties.96
Often, identifying the problem occurs during the information gathering stage.97
Throughout the entire process, an effective mediator works with the party to find
common goals.98 These goals help the mediator figure out which issues are going
to be able to settle or which ones focused on by the parties.99
A most commonly used method to settle disputes during mediation is the caucus.100 This caucus session is often a confidential session for each party to communicate transparently with the mediator without the other side being present.101
Once common ground between the parties is located through the caucus, a potential
settlement can occur.102

85. Grace E. D’Alo, Accountability In Special Education Mediation: Many a Slip ‘Twixt Vision and
Practice?, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 205 (2001).
86. Jessica Stepp, How Does the Mediation Process Work?, MEDIATE.COM (Feb. 2003),
http://www.mediate.com/articles/steppj.cfm.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id
92. Stepp, supra note 86.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Stepp, supra note 86.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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When Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 1997, it required that mediation be
available as a choice whenever a due process hearing from a third party is requested.103 There are several reasons why Congress began this mediation requirement.104 First, studies showed that mediation could resolve IDEA disputes more
quickly and more cheaply than due process hearings.105 Second, due to its informal
nature, mediation appeared to offer greater opportunity for participation by parents,
guardians, and school officials.106 This continues IDEA’s emphasis on collaboration for the betterment of the child’s education.107 Third, research showed that parties were more likely to accept and implement agreements reached in mediation.108
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, mediation appeared to allow all parties to
openly discuss their concerns and interests, potentially laying the groundwork for
more effective future relationships.109
As noted by Professor Grace E. D’Alo of Pennsylvania State University of
Law, mediation literature commonly refers to three potential mediation models: facilitative-broad, evaluative-narrow and transformative.110 The IDEA does not specify what model special education mediation should follow.111 IDEA only states that
mediation process must be voluntary and conducted by a “qualified and impartial
mediator who is trained in effective mediation techniques.”112
One of the models is known as “facilitative-broad” mediation.113 In this model,
mediators “focus primarily on aiding the parties in self-understanding and communicating their underlying interests.”114 Mediators under this model act to help
facilitate both parties’ dialogue but do not evaluate or judge the merits of each argument.115
Another model is the “evaluative-narrow” mediation model.116 This model
sees mediators focusing on the likely outcome if the dispute did not get resolved
(which, in special education disputes, is often a due process hearing).117 In this
model, the mediator’s role is to “provide the parties with an evaluation of the
strengths and weaknesses of each side’s case, the likely legal outcomes if the case
proceeds to a hearing, and a determination of reasonable settlement terms.”118
103. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 204 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2004)).
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Jonathan A. Beyer, A Modest Proposal: Mediating IDEA Disputes Without Splitting the
Baby, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 37, 45-46 (1999)).
106. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 204 (citing Jonathan A. Beyer, A Modest Proposal: Mediating IDEA
Disputes Without Splitting the Baby, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 37, 47 (1999)).
107. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 204.
108. Id. (citing Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 239 (1981)).
109. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 204 (citing Steven S. Goldberg & Dixie Snow Huefner, Dispute Resolution in Special Education: An Introduction to Litigation Alternatives, 99 EDUC. L. REP. 703, 705-06
(1995)).
110. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 205.
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A) (2004)).
113. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 205; see also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and
Techniques, CTR. FOR PUB. RESOURCES (Sept. 1994), https://www.starkmediator.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/4/2013/10/Old_Riskin_Grid1994.pdf.
114. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 205.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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A third model recognized by mediation literature is the “transformative” mediation model.119 In this model, mediators “focus their interventions on empowering
the parties by helping them reach self-understanding and encouraging mutual recognition of each other’s humanity and concerns.”120 Compared to the “evaluationmarrow” model, a mediator is much less likely to provide an explicit evaluation of
each side’s arguments and more likely to help each side understand the other’s point
of view.121
Special education mediation is a process in which both parties can be satisfied
with the result. For example, in 1997, Minnesota saw a high satisfaction rate among
mediation participants, with 94% saying they would use the process again and 96%
saying they would recommend mediation to others.122 Even as the actual success
rate of the mediation process dropped over 10% in subsequent years, the satisfaction
rates among participants have remained consistent.123 Mediation allows both parties to be satisfied with a result while avoiding costly litigation.124
The prevalence of special education mediation itself has been declining prior
to the Endrew decision. For example, the rate of special education mediation has
decreased from 2004 to 2012 as due process hearings dropped from under 7,000 to
slightly above 2,000 nationwide.125 When such mediations do take place, they often
successfully resolve the parties’ concerns. For example, mediations between 2004
to 2012, almost 70% of mediations resulted in agreements.126 These signed, written
mediation agreements are legally enforceable in any state or federal court.127

IV. INSTANT DECISION
With Chief Justice Roberts writing for a unanimous court, the Supreme Court
held that for a school to meet its substantive FAPE obligation under the IDEA, it
must offer an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”128
The Court’s “reasonably calculated” qualification reflects a recognition that
crafting an appropriate educational program for a child requires a variety of viewpoints (from school official’s expertise to the view of a child’s parents) and is consistent with the function of an IEP’s goal of a child’s advancements.129 The Court
noted that the potential progress contemplated by the IEP “must be appropriate in
light of the child’s circumstances” and therefore a concrete guidance is not appropriate in this case.130

119. Id.
120. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 205.
121. Id.
122. James Mortenson, Why Should We Mediate Special Education Claims, LDonline (1998),
http://www.ldonline.org/article/6302/.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Katherine McMurtrey, The IDEA and the Use of Mediation and Collaborative Dispute Resolution
in Due Process Disputes, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (2016).
126. Id. at 5.
127. Id.
128. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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The Court noted that Rowley shed a light on what appropriate progress will
look like in many cases.131 As seen in Rowley, a child fully integrated in the regular
classroom should have an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to
achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”132 However, a child’s
IEP does not need to aim for grade-level advancement if that is not a reasonable
expectation.133 Still, while a child’s goals may differ, the Court noted that “every
child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.”134 In addition, the
Court noted that an absence of a concrete bright-line rule should not be mistaken
for “an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational
policy for those of the school authorities which they review.”135
However, this decision was not a complete victim for Endrew’s parents. In
coming to this decision, the Court rejected Endrew’s parents’ argument that the
IDEA requires States to provide children with disabilities educational opportunities
that are “substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities.”136 However, because the Court rejected this view in Rowley and Congress
had not changed this standard after the decision, the Court did not accept this view
now.137

V. COMMENT
A. Endrew Was Correctly Decided
In rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s “de minimis” standard, the Supreme Court correctly decided that the IDEA required more from FAPE. As discussed during oral
arguments, the Supreme Court justices and the School District’s counsel could not
pinpoint the origins of the “de minimis” standard.138 The standard was not consistent with any previous Supreme Court ruling yet somehow was applied by the
majority of federal courts.139 As noted by Jeffrey Fisher, who was Endrew’s parents counsel, these courts needed “a kick” as the application of the “de minimis”
standard lead to inconsistent outcomes throughout the country.140 The Supreme
Court correctly gave these courts the kick they deserved, recognizing that such a
standard had no basis in special education law.
Furthermore, this low standard was recently condemned by multiple federal
legislators from both major political parties.141 For example, during Justice Neil

131. Id. at 1000.
132. Id. at 999.
133. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1001.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988,
999 (2017) (No. 15-827).
139. Id. at 62.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Andrew Chung, U.S. Justices Reject Gorsuch in Win for Disabled Student, U.S. NEWS
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2017-03-22/us-high-court-hands-disabledstudents-win-on-education-standards.
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Gorsuch’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings, the Endrew decision was announced.142 Justice Gorsuch was a member of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
who, while not directly involved with the Endrew decision, had previously used the
“de minimis” standard to rule against similar special education claims.143 In response to Endrew, multiple senators such as Democrats Chuck Schumer and Dick
Durbin and Republican John Cornyn questioned Justice Gorsuchfor applying the
now-rejected standard.144 In response to this questioning, Justice Gorsuch admitted that the decision to apply the low standard was wrong, and he apologized.145
Additionally, the use of the “de minimis” standard cannot logically be consistent with multiple landmark educational acts. For example, the No Child Left
Behind Act in 2004 was a revolutionary and bipartisan policy change for American
public-school education.146 No Child Left Behind intended to increase the measurable educational standards that students and educators were evaluated by while simultaneously aiming for academic growth throughout America.147 Allowing the
courts to apply a “de minimis” standard for special education student growth clearly
conflicts with this bipartisan legislative action.
In addition, as the Supreme Court noted, it cannot be consistent with the IDEA
to allow a normal functioning student to aim for grade level improvement year after
year but hold a special education student to a much lower standard.148 Therefore,
because of the lack of judicial support and legislative intent behind the “de minimis”
standard, the Court was correct to overturn the standard’s usage.
The Court was also correct in rejecting Endrew’s parent’s suggestion of “substantially equal” standard. A standard of aiming for grade to grade level improvement for all special education children’s IEP would be unworkable for schools and
courts. In addition, it would ignore the student’s individuality that drives IDEA’s
purpose. For example, today special education requirements and services apply to
a wide range of disabilities (i.e. Down Syndrome, Attention Deficit Disorder, and
countless more).149 To say that a child with Down Syndrome is entitled to a “substantially equal” goal as a general education student’s grade-to-grade progress or as
an ADHD student is unrealistic and not fair to the student.150 Such a goal is not
only unattainable for the student with Down Syndrome, but potentially detrimental
to the child since, by ignoring the student’s individual disability, it is likely that the
child would not be getting the best tailored individual services he needs. Since
Rowley, the Supreme Court has correctly recognized that a concrete standard for
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also Anya Kamenetz, The Supreme Court Rules in Favor of a Special Education Student,
NPR (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/03/22/521094752/the-supreme-court-rulesin-favor-of-a-special-education-student.
145. Kamenetz, supra note 144, at 1.
146. Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988
(2017) (No. 15-827).
147. Id.
148. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000-01 (2017).
149. See The Most Common Disabilities in School, TEACH-NOLOGY, http://www.teach-nology.com/teachers/special_ed/disabilities/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
150. It is important to note that academic achievement varies based even within one disability such as
Down Syndrome. However, students with Down Syndrome generally do not achieve grade to grade
improvement. See Thomas L. Layton, Developmental Scale for Children with Down Syndrome,
DSACC.ORG, http://www.dsacc.org/downloads/parents/downsyndromedevelopmentalscale.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
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FAPE is not possible due to the individualized nature of special education.151
Therefore, Endrew was correct in not only rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s “de minimis” standard but also rejecting Endrew’s parents proposed “substantially equal”
standard as well.

B. Endrew Could Lead To An Increase and Change to Special Education
Mediation.
As noted during oral arguments, the Endrew decision has the potential to impact over 8 million special education IEPs.152 While special education disputes
rarely find their way to courts, the Supreme Court recognized that this ruling had
the potential to massively increase special education litigation.153 With this increase of litigation looming, it is possible Endrew could drastically change the process and role of special education mediation going forward.
Traditionally, one of the concerns of special education mediation is that it can
significantly advantage the school over the parents or the child.154 Mediations are
private matters often meant to protect school reputation.155 Furthermore, ethical
concerns can arise since the state pays for the mediator to settle the dispute for state
funded schools.156 Also, schools can be “repeat players”, therefore school administrators are more likely than parents to be knowledgeable about the mediation and
IDEA processes.157 These advantages could result in the parents or the child having less power or control over the course of the mediation process than they should.
However, in light of Endrew, parents and students potentially could see an increase in mediation advantages. For example, in an evaluative mediation model
where the mediator provides the parties with an evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of each side’s case and the likely legal outcomes, Endrew ensures that
the child is guaranteed by law a higher standard than “de minimis.” Therefore, an
evaluative mediator would recognize that Endrew weakened a school’s case or potential legal outcome if a school really was only providing a child a minimal benefit.
This recognition could serve to mitigate the traditional advantage schools receive
in the mediation process. As Daniel Unumb, executive director of the Autism
Speaks Legal Resource Center, noted “[o]nce there’s an appropriate standard in
place and it’s understood that that is the standard that needs to be met, I think that
goes a long way to improving mediation and to improving attempts to avoid litigation.”158
In addition to the changes to the mediation process, the sheer number of special
education mediation may increase directly as a result of Endrew. While declining
in recent years, with as many as 8 million IEPs facing a potentially higher standard,
mediation could be the most efficient and effective method to solve this potentially
151. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 1001.
152. Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988
(2017) (No. 15-827).
153. Id.
154. McMurtrey, supra note 125, at 6.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Mark Keierleber, Why Advocates Hope the Supreme Court Will Save Special Education,
THE74MILLION (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.the74million.org/article/why-advocates-hope-the-supremecourt-will-save-special-education/.
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massive increase in disputes. If special education mediation is unsuccessful, the
cost to continue pursuing the special education claim is expensive. Further hearings
after mediation can cost both sides tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees.159 Furthermore, if a court finds a special education claim frivolous, all attorney’s fees can
be redirected back to the parents.160
For example, Jackie Pioli settled her dispute with her son’s Connecticut school
district just because further hearings would have costed the family as much as
$75,000 in legal fees, on top of the $25,000 already spent on representation.161 If
she knew the process would be so expensive, Pioli said she would have paid the
$45,000 tuition herself for the private school she wanted for her son to attend.162 In
addition to these costs, special education claims can be time consuming. For example, in Endrew, Endrew was in fourth grade when the issue of the case occurred and
was seventeen years old by the time his case reached the Supreme Court.163 With
almost 60% of children in special education throughout the United States living at
or below the federal poverty level, continuing a claim past mediation is often not
feasible.164
Therefore, because of the new standard adopted by Endrew, the process and
amount of special education mediation could drastically change in the future.

VI. CONCLUSION
Faced with its most significant special education case in decades, the Supreme
Court held that that a “de minimis” educational benefit is not enough to provide a
child with FAPE; rather, school districts must offer children IEP that is “reasonably
calculated to enable each child to make progress appropriate for that child’s circumstances.” In recognizing this higher standard, the Court rejected the test used by the
Tenth Circuit and the majority of federal courts to assess special education claims.
This higher standard was correctly decided in light of past Supreme Court decisions
and recent landmark educational act legislative intention. However, as a direct result of Endrew, the special education mediation process might change as it becomes
the most efficient matter to deal with the potential massive amount of change this
higher standard brings. As Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts noted, if
the de minimis standard could continue, special education students would “hardly
be said to have been offered an education at all.”165
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